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Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights, and
Corporate Responsibility, by Emily B. Laidlaw
Abstract

Regulating speech in cyberspace is a daring, interdisciplinary work that meets at the intersection of free
speech, corporate social responsibility, and human rights law. Written by Emily B. Laidlaw, an Assistant
Professor at the University of Calgary, the book successfully carves out a unique space in the literature that is
relatively unexplored. Although it situates itself in legal academia by offering an in-depth analysis of regulatory
frameworks used to police online speech, the work draws heavily on communication theories, international
development theories, and fundamental paradigms on human rights regimes. The result is a creative read that
challenges us to re-conceptualize how online speech may be regulated by engaging with theories and concepts
from a variety of disciplines.
Laidlaw starts her book with the notion that privately owned companies control democratic societies’
pathways of communication. Her analysis brilliantly invokes the work of Jürgen Habermas to engage in a
discussion of how online spaces may or may not resemble a form of the “public sphere.” One of the strengths
of the book is this initial framework that Laidlaw creates. Using foundational communication theories, she
helps the reader understand why technical, complex, and tedious regulatory frameworks for Internet
gatekeepers matter for “deliberative” democracy. She argues that although the Internet and various online
spaces are by no means perfectly analogous to Habermas’ public sphere, cafés and public squares of the past,
such spaces do currently act as key sites for the exchange of ideas. This makes the Internet and online spaces
critical for the flourishing of democracy. Regulating Speech in Cyberspace reminds the reader why debating
and analyzing the fine minutia of corporate responsibility models and regulatory frameworks for online
gatekeepers actually matters.
Cover Page Footnote
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Regulating Speech in Cyberspace:
Gatekeepers, Human Rights, and
Corporate Responsibility, by Emily B.
Laidlaw1
TANNER STANLEY2
REGULATING SPEECH IN CYBERSPACE is a daring, interdisciplinary work that

meets at the intersection of free speech, corporate social responsibility, and human
rights law. Written by Emily B. Laidlaw, an Assistant Professor at the University
of Calgary, the book successfully carves out a unique space in the literature that is
relatively unexplored. Although it situates itself in legal academia by offering an
in-depth analysis of regulatory frameworks used to police online speech, the work
draws heavily on communication theories, international development theories,
and fundamental paradigms on human rights regimes. The result is a creative
read that challenges us to re-conceptualize how online speech may be regulated
by engaging with theories and concepts from a variety of disciplines.
Laidlaw starts her book with the notion that privately owned companies
control democratic societies’ pathways of communication. Her analysis
brilliantly invokes the work of Jürgen Habermas to engage in a discussion of
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Emily B Laidlaw, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace: Gatekeepers, Human Rights and Corporate
Responsibility (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
JD Candidate 2018, Osgoode Hall Law School. Many thanks to Richard Haigh for his
invaluable commentary and guidance.
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how online spaces may or may not resemble a form of the “public sphere.”3 One
of the strengths of the book is this initial framework that Laidlaw creates. Using
foundational communication theories, she helps the reader understand why
technical, complex, and tedious regulatory frameworks for Internet gatekeepers
matter for “deliberative” democracy. She argues that although the Internet and
various online spaces are by no means perfectly analogous to Habermas’ public
sphere, cafés and public squares of the past, such spaces do currently act as key
sites for the exchange of ideas.4 This makes the Internet and online spaces critical
for the flourishing of democracy. Regulating Speech in Cyberspace reminds the
reader why debating and analyzing the fine minutia of corporate responsibility
models and regulatory frameworks for online gatekeepers actually matters.
Laidlaw then lays down the foundational concepts of online gatekeepers
and corporate social responsibility. Here, her overarching argument is that such
online gatekeepers have a sliding scale of responsibility based on the extent to
which they can facilitate or inhibit democracy. It is nuanced and compelling.
Laidlaw leaves the reader comfortable with the role that gatekeepers play and
helps them better understand how legislatures, courts, and other actors have not
sufficiently determined how to regulate the dynamic nature of digital channels of
communication. This premise is of course critical to her thesis, which argues that
a new, alternative model of corporate social responsibility is needed to regulate
such gatekeepers in a fashion that is friendly to democracy.
Although her writing on gatekeepers is particularly nuanced, the chapter
on corporate social responsibility (CSR) stalls. It reads like a textbook chapter
for an introductory course on corporate responsibilities and duties. Although
many readers will most likely appreciate an explanation of basic corporate social
responsibility models and concepts, particularly if the ideas are new and novel,
this chapter strays from the book’s main contention and thesis. The discussion is
also isolated from regulating cyber speech. Although she does come back in later
chapters to evoke the concepts laid out in this section, the structure is cumbersome.
After this conceptual background, Laidlaw dives into two case studies.
The first analyzes Internet service providers as mechanisms of information
control; the second turns to search engines in the context of free speech and
access to information. These case studies are particular examples of how Internet
information gatekeepers, in the context of utilizing CSR “as a facilitative force
for socially responsible governance” can either help or hinder participation
3.
4.

Moral Consciousness and Communicative Action, translated by Christian Lenhardt & Shierry
Weber Nicholsen (Cambridge, Mass: Polity Press, 1990).
Laidlaw, supra note 1 at 13-14.
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in democratic culture.5 The case studies illuminate her argument that such
gatekeepers represent critical actors in a democratic system; she demonstrates
that a new, alterative model for corporate social responsibility is needed, as the
traditional model does not sufficiently address digital human rights.
These two case studies prove insightful. Executed with near surgical
precision, they focus in on the technical complexities of regulations guiding the
International Watch Foundation and detailed reasoning of cases that interpret
free speech rights’ relationship with search engines. Much of the literature on
gatekeepers and cyber speech tends to either offer summaries of such regulatory
frameworks or side-steps in-depth discussion altogether and typically relies on
more basic arguments about the role of the Internet in facilitating democratic
discourse.6 Laidlaw doesn’t hesitate to get into technical regulatory details at the
same time as remaining mindful of larger themes.
More importantly, she employs the two case studies to illustrate two different
ways in which the traditional corporate social responsibility model fails to
sufficiently protect human rights and safeguard cyber speech. This culminates in
the final chapter where she proposes an alternative corporate social responsibility
model designed to avoid both the downfalls of traditional models and the blunt
ineffectiveness of legal remedies in regulating cyber speech. Her model focusses
on three areas: (1) education, policy, and research, (2) corporate support, and
(3) developing a remedial mechanism. It is designed to highlight the responsive
nature of the interplay of layers of regulation.
While Laidlaw’s approach draws on various ideas, models, and concepts
from other commentators, her proposal is novel, creative, and nuanced. For
her, regulations matter. The challenge is finding a way to institute effective,
well-designed rules and regulations. Laidlaw’s model rewards her commitment to
discussing complex, micro-regulatory details and illuminating their importance
for democratic systems.
Laidlaw best embodies this complexity when articulating the theoretical
basis for her model. This model “has both an external element in the form of a
regulatory body independent of IIGs [internet information gatekeepers] and an
5.
6.

Ibid at 61.
See generally Lincoln Dahlberg, “The Internet and Democratic Discourse: Exploring the
Prospects of Online Deliberative Forums Extending The Public Sphere” (2001) 4:4 Inf,
Comm & Soc 615; Zizi Papacharissi, “Democracy Online: Civility, politeness, and the
democratic potential of online political discussion groups” (2004) 6:2 New Media & Soc
259; KA Hill & JE Hughes, Cyberpolitics: Citizen Activism in the Age of the Internet (New
York: Rowman & Littefield, 1998); Rabia Karakaya Polat, “The Internet and Political
Participation: Exploring the Explanatory Links” (2005) 20:4 Eur J of Comm 435.
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internal element integrating the model into an IIG’s internal operations and due
diligence.”7 The external element includes an independent body, in partnership
with governments, charged with the task of human rights regulation.8 The
internal element is described as a “blueprint for a business fulfilling its corporate
responsibility to respect human rights.”9 Further, her model is specifically designed
to link and connect the various approaches to regulation “in a complementary,
mutually reinforcing way.”10 While Laidlaw’s model with external and internal
levels may sound simplistic, it is in fact nuanced and its genius lies in its ability
to seamlessly incorporate the micro-regulatory details she describes as being
essential to regulating cyberspace and protecting human rights.
In conclusion, Regulating Speech in Cyberspace is a well argued, well
researched, and well-articulated work that proposes a noteworthy alternative
corporate social responsibility model to guide private actors in the regulation of
cyber speech. As current corporate social responsibility models fail to protect
cyber speech, democracy suffers.
Laidlaw’s success is partly due to resisting the many opportunities to get
trapped into unfocused, contextualized summaries of technical regulatory details.
Instead, her detail-focused analysis is paired with larger narratives and themes
about public spheres and spaces, and the role the Internet has as a democratizing
force. And all of this takes place in a persuasive and clear style, making the book
easily digestible and understandable for readers unfamiliar with the topic.
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Laidlaw, supra note 1 at 250.
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